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Each administration in the modern era has had a management reform 
agenda, and the next one will, too. The transition is a time of opportunity and 
risk. The key to exploiting the opportunity and mitigating the risk is to make 
the transition from the current agenda to the next one seamless and 
constructive.  
Too often, anything associated with the previous regime is discarded 
and replaced with something new. Too often “new” reforms are not—they are 
variations on what came before. Is there a way to make the next reform 
agenda politically distinct while capitalizing on what preceded it? 
This paper addresses that question in the specific context of the 
Defense Department. Our desire is that the next administration builds its 
management reform program from an informed foundation. The career 
executives who transcend administrations should also understand this history 
and the transition process so they might help minimize the disruption and be 
more capable advisors. 
The Center for Defense Management Reform appreciates that you took 
the time to read this working paper. While my name is on the front, it was a 
team effort by those listed at left. We welcome your feedback.  
 
With best regards, 
 
Philip J. Candreva 
Acting Director 
Director in Absentia 
Hon. Douglas A. Brook, Ph.D. 
 
Acting Director 
Philip J. Candreva, M.S. 
 
Associate Director 
Cynthia L. King, Ph.D. 
 
Research Associates 
Kenneth Euske, Ph.D. 
William R. Gates, Ph.D. 
Timothy D. Hartge, M.A. 
Ira A. Lewis, Ph.D. 
Lisa Lindsey, Ph.D. 
Edward H. Powley, Ph.D. 
Anita Salem, M.S. 




















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of 
critical importance to defense management.  A working paper is a forum in which to 
accomplish a variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular 
piece of research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) 
put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a 
preliminary draft of an eventual article in a scholarly periodical, (5) provide a tutorial 
(such as a technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue 
among practitioners and researchers that encourages debate and discussion on 
topics of mutual importance.  A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for 
academic and research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, 
particularly when in its early stages.  The primary intent is to induce critical thinking 
about important issues or problems that will become part of the professional body of 
knowledge about defense management.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be 
published in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as 
technical reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, 
or as a variety of other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories, and principles will 
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Abstract 
Each presidential administration brings a management reform agenda to bear 
on the executive branch. Reform agendas differ between administrations, but tend to 
address a finite set of management problems. Because the origin of such agendas is 
part political, it is inevitable that the current reform agenda will change. Given the 
materiality of the Defense Department and its persistent management issues, reform 
agendas have a wide-reaching impact on the allocation of resources and the 
attention of senior managers. This report looks at the confluence of two dynamics. 
First, it explores the nature and recent history of defense management reform, with 
particular emphasis on the governance structures that are a hallmark of the Bush-
era reform agenda. Second, it explores the nature of presidential transitions with 
particular attention paid to the role of the career executive in facilitating the change, 
and the unique circumstances in the DoD. It concludes with recommendations for 
the outgoing administration, the incoming administration and the career executives 
to help ease the transition from the current reform agenda to the next in a manner 
that exploits recent gains while being aligned with the strategies of the new 
administration. While written primarily for Defense officials, many of the lessons are 
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1. Introduction 
During the George W. Bush Administration, the business processes and 
systems operated by the Defense Department have received considerable attention. 
Even while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan receive the most public attention, 
thousands of defense employees have been steadily reforming the business aspects 
of the department.  The administration has made progress on many fronts, but there 
is still significantly more to do: not a single business area has been removed from 
the High Risk list maintained by the GAO.1  
A robust management reform agenda was not an original idea; it followed a 
lengthy succession of reform initiatives going back decades. Each new 
administration tends to bring its own reform agenda—and the next will, too—but 
these seldom flow seamlessly from one administration to another. Given the 
progress of the current administration in transforming business management in the 
Department of Defense, what is the likelihood that management reform will survive 
through the upcoming transition of presidential administrations?   
The aim of this report is to examine the recent history of defense 
management reform movements and past transitions. From that information, 
recommendations will be made to the three groups of participants most responsible 
for a successful transition: the outgoing administration, the incoming administration, 
and the career executives.2 
The report is organized in three sections. The first section describes trends in 
defense management reform. It considers the actions of the past several secretaries 
of defense, the areas on which Congress (specifically the GAO) has and probably 
                                            
1 Government Accountability Office. (2007, January). High risk series: An update (GAO-07-310). 
Washington, DC: Author. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 2 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
will continue to focus, the recent major reform efforts inside the DoD, and the advice 
of the “good government” advocates. The objective of this section is to outline the 
reform trajectory for those involved in the transition. 
The second section covers the issue of governance of reform initiatives. A 
notable aspect of the Bush (43) reforms has been their governance structures. The 
new administration taking power in a few months will need to be cognizant of those 
structures and why they were created; it must be sensitive to the lessons of the 
recent past. Change will inevitably occur to suit the leadership preferences of the 
new administration, but knowledge and understanding of the position from which the 
change originates will better inform decisions about new governance structures.  
The third section describes the presidential transition process from the 
perspectives of the three participants (the outgoing administration, the incoming 
administration, and the career executives) along three critical time periods: pre-
election, the interregnum, and post-inauguration. The objective of this section is to 
inform those who have not previously participated in a presidential transition 
regarding the events, opportunities and risks, specifically those which concern 
reformers. 
Finally, this study makes recommendations to all three groups with an eye 
toward a more seamless transition of reform initiatives. Those recommendations are 
summarized at the end. Ideally, the new president and defense secretary will 
capitalize on recent gains while implementing a management reform agenda that, for 
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2. Defense Management Reform  
“But reform agendas usually do not transition well through leadership 
changes. Instead, each new administration embarks de novo, without benefit 
of knowing what has happened in the past, what has worked, what hasn’t, 
and what the current state of reform is. A key question for us to consider is 
whether it can be different this time around.” 
Douglas A. Brook3 
Each presidential administration brings its own management reform agenda 
to the agencies of the federal government. Defense, as the largest agency and one 
replete with business management problems, is the frequent subject of specific 
reforms—in addition to the government-wide agenda. The Clinton Administration 
attempted to “reinvent” government, while the Bush Administration has attempted to 
“transform” it. The next administration will undoubtedly have its own reform agenda, 
but it will need to be situated along the recent history of reform movements. What 
have been the trends in management reform in the federal government and, 
specifically, in the DoD? Is it reasonable to think that the areas of interest for the 
past few years will continue to be areas of interest and that contemporary reform 
trends will persist for a while into the next administration? Or is a new management 
agenda likely to emerge?  Those trends are explored from four vantage points 
below.   
First, we examined the management reform agendas of the past six 
secretaries of defense (three Democrats and three Republicans) and studied the 
areas they emphasized. Second, we examined the reforms of the present era—both 
those initiated inside the DoD and those that have resulted from external influences. 
Third, we examined the published work of the Government Accountability Office and 
analyzed trends in the functional domains of those reports. Fourth, we reviewed the 
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writings of academics and practitioners over the past year that address the 
upcoming transition: issues the next administration is likely to face (either by design, 
inheritance or happenstance) and things the new administration ought to do. 
Combining these four views, we describe the reform trajectory going into the next 
administration. 
A. Past Defense Management Reform Initiatives 
In 2006, the Center for Defense Management Reform published a 
comprehensive survey of the management reform initiatives of the Secretaries of 
Defense from Forrestal through Rumsfeld.4 Using self-reported data from the annual 
Secretary of Defense reports to Congress, the authors catalogued 513 reform 
initiatives and classified them along several dimensions. 
Figure 1 depicts the number of reform initiatives under each of the last six 
secretaries by the area the reform addressed.  We see that the number of reform 
initiatives, in general, has trended upward. Acquisition and logistics reforms are the 
most common, but under some administrations, organizational structure reforms are 
slightly higher. These include reorganizations, the creation of new organizations, 
elimination of old ones, and personnel reforms. Reforms to financial management 
and budgeting systems are third most common, and those involving infrastructure, 
facilities or energy usage policy are the least common.  
 
                                            
4 Francis, D.B., & Walther, R.J. (2006). A comparative history of department of defense management 
reform from 1947 to 2005 (Report NPS-CDMR-GM-06-009). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
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Figure 1. Functional Areas of Defense Management Reform 
Does the political party in office during the administration of the secretary 
make a difference?  Figure 2 depicts the same data, sorted by political party.  We 
see that reforms during Democratic administrations concentrate on acquisition and 
logistics more so than on organizational structure more so than on financial issues or 
infrastructure. Republicans, on the other hand, stress organizational structure more 
than acquisition and, like the Democrats, have fewer reforms in the financial and 
infrastructure areas. Given the statements by the 2008 presidential candidates, 
these trends may or may not continue. McCain has made repeated references to 
acquisition reform: “Our servicemen and women who risk their lives for us deserve a 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
ineffective and susceptible to mismanagement and even corruption."5  Obama 
addressed matters of organization: "When it comes to hiring people in my 
administration, the litmus test we'll apply will not be based on party or ideology, but 
qualification and experience."6  We expect the historical pattern to repeat: 
acquisition/logistics and organization/structure as the two most prominent areas of 
reform, and financial management and facilities/infrastructure as the areas less 
emphasized. 
Political Party Reform Emphasis by Area


























Figure 2. Defense Management Reform Emphasis by Political Party 
                                            
5 McCain, J. (2008). Address to the Oklahoma State Legislature on government reform, 21 May 2007. 
Remarks as prepared for delivery. Retrieved April 20, 3008, from 
http://www.johnmccain.com/informing/news/speeches/48474414-5864-4de8-921e-
d2d51de82bdd.htm 
6 Obama, B. (2008). Campaign speech, Manchester, NH, June 22, 2007. Remarks as prepared for 
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Figures 1 and 2, however, do not consider the length of the tenure of the 
secretary. One might presume that a secretary who held office for four years might 
initiate four times the number of reforms than one who held office for one year. On 
the other hand, one might also suspect that reforms would be initiated early in the 
secretary’s tenure, with the later years of a longer terms devoted to implementation 
and institutionalization. What do the data show?  
Figure 3 addresses the tenure of the secretary, the total number of reforms, 
and notes the number of reforms per month. As with Figure 2, we see that 
Democrats have initiated more reforms than Republicans, despite holding office for 
less time. The last three Democratic secretaries initiated 146 reforms in 96 months, 
or 1.5 per month on average. The last three Republican secretaries initiated 84 
reforms in 129 months, or 0.65 per month on average. Republicans initiated less 
than half the reforms, over time, Democrats did. Given the conservative reputation of 
the Republican Party, and progressive reputation of the Democratic Party, this is not 
unexpected. Clearly, Secretary Cohen is the outlier, with over 80 initiatives; 
Rumsfeld, Perry, Aspin and Cheney had two to three dozen each regardless of the 
length of their tenure, so they may represent the norm. There is no apparent 
increase in the number of reforms when one political party displaces another. We 
can only conclude that the new secretary—regardless of party—will behave more 
like the norm and initiate two or three dozen new reforms. Given the rhetoric of 
change in the 2008 presidential race (from both sides but more so from the 
Democrats), it seems reasonable to expect the scope of reforms to be in the normal 
range (24-36), with a Democratic administration possibly initiating a number closer to 
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B. 2001-2008 Reforms 
What is the current state of business management reform in the DoD and 
how did it get here?  We can examine management reform in the Department of 
Defense in the George W. Bush Administration by considering both external and 
internal influences. It can also be viewed in historical perspective. 
Francis and Walther showed a long history of business management reform 
in the DoD: every secretary of defense had a management agenda of some sort.  
More recently, the decade of the 1990s saw a series of initiatives.  Some, like the 
CFO Act, the Government Performance and Results Act, the Government 
Management and Reform Act and the Federal Financial Management Improvement 
Act emanated from Capitol Hill. Others, like Defense Management Reform and the 
Defense Reform Initiative came from inside the Department. Taken together, they 
set the precedent for the current era of management reform. It is focused on matters 
of accountability, transparency, efficiency and performance. The requirements of the 
acts of Congress continue to influence the reform activities of the Department. The 
initiatives associated with particular administrations (DMR and DRI) have faded, but 
some of their objectives—streamlining and cost savings, for instance—can be found 
in current reforms.  
Just as with many past management reform periods, the 2001-2008 reform 
agenda at the DoD was heavily influenced from outside the Department.  The most 
important external influences came from the Government Accountability Office, 
Congress, and the White House and its Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
The DoD has consistently been on the GAO’s high-risk list in multiple areas deemed 
to be at risk for fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement. Ironically, in 2007, the 
DoD’s approach to business transformation itself was put on the GAO high-risk list.7 
Furthermore, the DoD has consistently failed to achieve auditability in its financial 
                                            
7 Government Accountability Office. (2007). Performance and accountability report.  Retrieved July 
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statements, and numerous GAO reports have detailed financial management 
failures in the DoD.   
In response, Congress held hearings on management at the DoD and put 
new requirements on the Department for management reform. It mandated the 
establishment of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee  in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal 2005. In 2006-2007, the GAO 
advocated for a Chief Management Officer position. The fiscal 2008 NDAA 
designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Department’s CMO, created a 
new position of Deputy Chief Management Officer for the DoD, and designated the 
service undersecretaries as the CMOs in the departments of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. The fiscal 2009 NDAA, currently under consideration in Congress, contains a 
provision directing the formation of business transformation offices in each of the 
service components. 
Moreover, the Bush Administration came into office with a management 
focus. The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) established government-wide 
initiatives in five key areas. A PMA scorecard was developed to rate agencies on 
their progress and on their results. The DoD has scored consistently in the red for 
results and has varied from green to yellow to red for progress.  In 2004, the OMB 
directed agencies to combine the performance and financial reports required under 
the Government Performance and Results Act GPRA and the CFO Act into a single 
annual Performance and Accountability Report.   
The Department’s military and political leaders have also sought to improve 
management. The DoD’s initial internal call for management reform came in the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report.  The report said the DoD “must 
transform its business processes […] to enhance the capabilities and creativity of its 
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military capabilities.”8  The QDR Report outlined an agenda—including streamlining 
and flattening the organizational structure, focusing resources on being excellent in 
areas that contribute to warfighting, modernizing the department’s approach to 
business information, and consolidating and modernizing infrastructure.  Further, 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s memo of July 19, 2001, argued that the DoD must 
“change the Department’s business operations and systems” in order to have 
reliable, timely, and accurate financial management information. He established the 
Financial Management Modernization Program for “control and oversight of systems 
development, acquisition, upgrade, deployment and other changes for all financial 
management systems and related non-financial business systems.” Rumsfeld further 
defined non-financial business systems as “those that support the acquisition, 
medical, transportation, property, inventory, supply and personnel communities.”9.  In 
September 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated his commitment to business 
transformation, saying, “The war on terrorism does not supplant the need to 
transform the DoD; instead we must accelerate our organizational, operational, 
business and process reforms.”10  The August 25, 2003, list of the secretary’s top 
priorities for the following sixteen months included “streamline DoD processes—
shorten PPBS and acquisition cycle time, financial management reform, shorten 
DoD processes by 50% and output metrics built around balanced risk and the 
President’s Management Agenda.”11  Although reengineering as a business change 
method had become outdated, some of the language remained behind.  The 2002 
DoD Annual Report calls for realigning, restructuring, streamlining, and focusing on 
core functions.  
                                            
8 Department of Defense. (2001). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC: Author, p. 51. 
9 Rumsfeld, D. (2001, July 19). Financial management in the Department of Defense. Memorandum. 
Washington, DC: Author, p. 1. 
10 Rumsfeld, D. (2002, September). Legislative priorities for fiscal year 2004. Memorandum. 
Washington, DC: Author, p. 1. 
11 Rumsfeld, D. (2003, August 25). Legislative priorities for fiscal year 2005. Memorandum. 
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Thus, the agenda for defense business management transformation in the 
2001-2008 period was set by a combination of external and internal imperatives. 
External pressures came from exposed weaknesses in defense management and 
the reform agendas of the GAO, Congress and the White House. Internally, the push 
for business transformation came from a need to support the transformation in 
warfighting with a transformation in business practices. The goal for external players 
was better management; the goals for internal players was better management and 
more economic or efficient management to make resources available to meet 
warfighter requirements. 
The evolution of business transformation described above has lead to a set of 
enterprise-wide initiatives that are ongoing and will carry into the transition to a new 
administration.  Among the major items in this portfolio are: 
 The Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) program, 
designed to improve internal controls and financial reporting aimed at 
achieving auditability for the DoD and component financial statements. 
 The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), 
which integrates the military pay and personnel systems. 
 A joint emphasis on requirements definition and recapitalization. The 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Capability Portfolio 
Management (CPM) provide a new way to examine and make 
resource-allocation decisions. 
 The National Security Personnel System (NSPS), which introduces 
performance-based management of the civilian workforce. 
 Acquisition reforms, including corporate decision, lifecycle 
management, commodity councils, configuration steering boards and 
energy initiatives. 
 Competitive sourcing initiatives for non-inherently governmental 
activities. 
These initiatives parallel the topical areas addressed in the historical 
iterations of sixty years of defense management reform; they also, as we will see in 
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data from the GAO, scholars and pundits: financial management, human resources, 
business process improvement, transparency/accountability and program 
effectiveness.   
One reform initiative certain to transition between administrations is the 
congressional requirement for the Department and the service components to have 
Chief Management Officers. The NDAA of 2008 designated the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense as the Department’s Chief Management Officer (CMO), mandated a new 
Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) for the OSD, and required that the under 
secretaries of each of the services be designated as CMOs. The DoD is working to 
implement the CMO structure. A strategic management plan and implementation 
plan for CMO/DCMO was delivered to Congress in July 2008, as required by the FY 
2008 NDAA. The office of DCMO will be established before the end of the fiscal year 
and the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) will report to the new 
DCMO. Looking ahead, the FY 2009 NDAA, which at this writing has passed the 
House, contains a requirement for each of the services to create business 
transformation offices—seemingly to mirror the CMO-BTA structure at the OSD. The 
office of the DCMO is seen as “a mechanism to ensure the continuity of business 
transformation between Administrations.”12  
Business transformation is not limited to the OSD; one can find in the military 
departments two sets of initiatives, those promoted by the secretariat and those 
promoted by the uniformed leadership. 
1. Business Transformation in the Department of the Navy 
In 2008, the Department of the Navy identified an existing inventory of 29 
transformation initiatives in the areas of acquisition reform, business process 
redesign, enterprise realignment, financial control and accountability, healthcare 
                                            
12 Department of Defense. (2008, July 25). Implementation report for the National Defense 
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services, human capital, IT modernization, joint base operations, and supply chain 
management. 
A large part of the Navy transformation effort is associated with the employment of 
the enterprise concept, first championed by the naval aviation community and later 
incorporated into the Sea Power 21 vision of then-Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark. 
Sea Enterprise was the resource-enabling component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 
initiative.  In recognition of a future resource-constrained environment, Sea Enterprise 
aimed to reform the culture and business practices of the Navy so as to generate resources 
internally that can be applied to reinvestment and recapitalization. “Sea Enterprise is the 
Navy’s flagship effort for freeing up additional resources to support military transformation 
initiatives through streamlining naval business processes.”13  “Sea Enterprise will help us 
identify, devise, and implement the tools that facilitate appropriate levels of risk in the 
Navy’s business operations, and to undertake the types of reform and restructuring needed 
to significantly reduce operating costs.”14  Admiral Michael Mullen, Clark’s successor as 
Chief of Naval Operations, explained, “Sea Enterprise is about creating fiscal opportunity 
across the Navy enterprise.”15  Sea Enterprise was essentially an efficiency-seeking reform; 
it evolved into Navy Enterprise during 2006 and 2007. Currently, subordinate enterprise 
initiatives are underway in the aviation, surface warfare, and subsurface warfare 
communities.  The focus of Navy Enterprise remains on cost savings and fostering an 
enterprise-wide view of managing and resourcing the Navy:  
Navy Enterprise is an initiative designed to improve the understanding of 
our business practices so we remain the most effective and efficient 
Navy in the world. […] Our two key methods to improve ROI [return on 
investment] are: 
                                            
13 US Navy. (2006). Naval transformation roadmap. Retrieved July 6, 2006, from 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/ navpalib/transformation/trans-pg93.html 
14 US Navy. (2005). Sea enterprise. Retrieved July 9, 2008, from 
https://ucsobdom02.hq.navy.mil/seaent/seadoc01.nsf/(vwDocsByAttachment)/About 
15 Mullen, M.G. (2004, January). Sea enterprise: Resourcing tomorrow’s fleet. Naval Institute 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 15 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Improving the output/cost ratio associated with all major processes  
 Aligning and resourcing our lines of business to achieve the intended 
outcome in the most effective and efficient manner.16  
Today, the Navy is using Lean Six Sigma to create a culture of continuous 
improvement and to drive change in Navy processes. The Navy has been working to 
improve the business management skills of its military leaders through executive 
education programs for senior and flag-level officers.  
The Department of the Navy is also working to implement the requirement for 
a CMO. An acting CMO has been named, and work is underway to develop a 
strategic management plan, an implementation plan, and a portfolio of 
transformation initiatives for CMO oversight. The Navy has established a Business 
Transformation Council (consisting of senior civilian and military members) to 
oversee and coordinate business transformation in the department and align with the 
OSD-level activities. The Navy expects to establish the position of DCMO in the fall 
of 2008.   
2. Business Transformation in the Department of the Army 
The Army has also recognized the importance of transforming its business 
activities to support its operational transformation efforts.  The Army has ongoing 
efforts to transform its business operations through initiatives such as: Personnel 
Transformation, the Business Management Modernization Program, Portfolio 
Management of Business Information Systems, the Balanced Scorecard approach, 
and Logistics Transformation and Institutional Army Adaptation.17  Lean Six Sigma is 
the Army’s tool of choice to drive across-the-board elimination of unnecessary or 
wasteful processes, the reduction of process variability, and the improvement of 
                                            
16 Navy Enterprise. (2008) Retrieved July 2, 2008, from http://www.navyenterprise.navy.mil  
17 Secretary of the Army. (2006). Management oversight of the Army’s business transformation 
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quality.18  The Army set an initial goal to identify at least $2.5 billion from FY2007 
onward through improvements in cycle-time reduction and output quality 
improvement.19  In addition, the Army is now looking at employing the enterprise 
concept, based on the Navy model, to address organizational and resource-
allocation issues.  The Army is also investing in business education for senior 
officers and is linking business management experience to promotions. 
The Department of the Army is also establishing its CMO office. A DCMO 
position will be established and held by a career executive who will also serve as the 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Management and as Deputy Director of the 
Army Enterprise Task Force.20  
3. Business Transformation in the Department of the Air Force 
The Air Force’s definition of transformation is conceptually similar to the 
DoD’s.  The Air Force defines transformation as “[a] process by which the military 
achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, 
organization, and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting 
capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.”21  
The USAF approaches business transformation through Integrated Process Teams 
and has aimed to create new processes through its Smart Ops 21 program. Smart 
Ops 21 encompasses the improvement tools of Lean, Six Sigma and Theory of 
                                            
18 US Army. (2006). About continuous process improvement. Retrieved July 31, 2006, from 
http://www.army.mil/ArmyBTKC/focus/cpi/index.htm 
19 Secretary of the Army. (2006).  
20 Department of Defense. (2008, July 25), p. 2. 
21 US Air Force. (2004). The US Air Force transformation flight plan 2004 (HQ USAF/XPXC). 
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Constraints.  Ultimately, Air Force leadership wants to use Smart Ops 21 to initiate a 
cultural change across the Air Force.22   
The Department of the Air Force intends to establish the position of DCMO. 
Air Force is examining existing governance practices, is benchmarking with the 
private sector, and has formed a cross-functional workshop team to define CMO 
roles and responsibilities.  Air Force plans “where feasible to consolidate existing 
business improvement processes under a common umbrella of CMO activities.”23  
C. Future Defense Management Reforms 
Above, we have discussed the history and current status of business 
management reform in the Department of Defense. We now turn to a consideration 
of what the likely reform agenda might be for the next administration and whether 
there is a link between the current and likely future agendas that could define the 
future reform trajectory. To address these questions, we consider two sources of 
reform policy: the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the writings of 
academic and practitioner experts in defense management.  
1. Government Accountability Office 
As the federal government’s central audit agency, the Government 
Accountability Office is a both a tool of accountability and an agent for improvement 
of the operation of the federal government. As noted in its annual Performance and 
Accountability Report:  
GAO performs a range of oversight-, insight-, and foresight-related 
engagements, a vast majority of which are conducted in response to 
Congressional mandates or requests. GAO’s engagements include 
evaluations of federal programs and performance, financial and management 
                                            
22 Lopez, T.C. (2006, May 11). Smart Operations 21 office formed at Pentagon. Retrieved August 7, 
2008, from http://www.ctlopez.com/story/2006_05_11.html 
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audits, policy analyses, legal opinions, bid protest adjudications, and 
investigations.24  
Since its products range from oversight to foresight, the Office can serve as an 
indicator of both contemporary problems and prospective areas of concern. We 
conducted two reviews of the GAO’s work. 
In the first review, we queried the GAO’s database for all reports containing 
either the word “transformation” or the phrase “management reform” in the title or 
abstract, irrespective of bureau or agency evaluated. We pulled data from January 
2000 to April 2008, generating 362 reports. Reports that were not evaluative in 
nature, such as legal opinions or the annual report summarizing the GAO’s budget 
request, were eliminated. The report titles were then sorted into 15 categories based 
on the functional area being evaluated: contracting, human resources, program 
effectiveness, information technology, and the like. A total of 298 unique report 
titles25 remained. Some reports covered more than one functional area. For example, 
a report about the use of information technology to improve financial management 
would be listed in both the financial management and the information technology 
categories. In the end, our dataset had 340 items. Our summary data is included in 
Table 1. 
The data reveal increasing numbers of reports about management reform, 
starting with 15 in 2000 and rising quickly to 50 in 2003. This may simply be due to 
the more frequent use of the vocabulary of reform and transformation. These terms 
are fairly unique to the Bush Administration and displaced terms such as reinvention 
and reengineering.  From 2003 until 2007, the number ranged from 32 to 52. In 
2008, there were 16 in the first one-third of the year, still within that range. 
                                            
24 Government Accountability Office. (2007).  
25 In some cases, a report is issued concurrent with testimony by a member of GAO or the 
Comptroller General himself. The database query would generate two documents, the report and the 
hearing transcript. Since the hearing transcript is normally just a summary of the report findings, these 
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Government-wide, the GAO issues a report about management reform almost once 
per week. Overall, a little more than one-third were focused on the DoD—with two 
years, 2005 and 2006, above the trend. This is partially due to the advent of the 
National Security Personnel System and an overall decrease in reports on other 
parts of government.  
Table 1. GAO Reports on Management Reform, 2000-2008 
 
Figure 4 displays the number of reports from the three most recent complete 
years in descending order of frequency (dark bars). The most common areas on 
which the GAO has reported are human resources (28 reports or 21%), program 
effectiveness (20 reports or 15%), defense business transformation and general 
management reform (12 reports or 9%), and a miscellaneous category (11 reports or 
8%). The three least common were internal controls (2 reports or 1.5%), budgeting 
(3 reports or 2%), and performance management, reporting, and the President’s 
Management Agenda (3 reports or 2%). There is a fairly wide distribution of 
functional areas addressed in the reports, with the top three accounting for 46% of 
the 131 studies.  
Comparing the earliest three years of the data set (light bars) to the latest three, we 
see there has not only been an increase in the number of reports, there has been a 
shift in their emphasis.  There is more concentration of emphasis on this category in 
this earlier period, especially in the area of financial management (18 reports or 
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resources was third (7 reports or 12.5%).  The top three accounted for 68% of the 56 
reports. Areas such as Defense business transformation and budgeting had no 
reports in those earlier years. 
Government-wide GAO Reports on Management Reform
(2005-2007 n=131; 2000-2002 n=56)
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Figure 4. GAO Reform Studies, Areas of Emphasis,  
2000-2002 versus 2005-2007 
We also looked at the GAO reports that focused specifically on the Defense 
Department. In this analysis, we did not limit ourselves to areas of management 
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gain a sense of the degree to which business transformation is emphasized relative 
to other areas of interest. We queried the GAO database in the same fashion, 
limiting the time horizon to January 2006 to April 2008, resulting in 403 reports. After 
removing duplicates and those not evaluative in nature, we had 380 reports. They 
logically sorted into 15 categories (and one miscellaneous) and, due to complex 
reports (e.g., budgeting for medical support appears in two categories), there are 
435 items in the dataset.  
Which areas of defense have most captured the attention of the GAO? Figure 
5 is arranged like Figure 4, in order of descending frequency. The topic most 
frequently addressed was systems acquisition (84 reports, 22%), followed by human 
resources to include both civilian and uniformed matters (52 reports, 14%), and 
matters related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (46 reports, 12%). There are 
some business-like matters imbedded in many of the non-businesslike categories, 
and they were coded in two groups. For instance, a report on oversight of 
contracting in Iraq appears in both “War” and “Contracting.” The categories 
containing most of the business reform reports (in descending order) include 
acquisition, human resources, contracting, maintenance/logistics, financial 
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GAO Reports on DoD 2006-2008 by Functional Area
(n=441)
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Figure 5. GAO Reports on the Defense Department by Functional Area 
Considering the government-wide data along with the DoD-specific data, what 
do we see as trends in GAO evaluation and reporting?  First, the GAO has 
emphasized program effectiveness over the past decade, and we expect that trend 
to continue. The GAO not only provides insight and oversight from an accountability 
perspective, it provides recommendations to the Executive departments—
recommendations that Congress expects to be implemented. Between 1998 and 
2007, the share of GAO products containing recommendations doubled from a 
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recommendations that were implemented within four years rose from 69% to 82%.26  
Clearly the GAO is taking a more activist role in promoting business transformation.  
Second, we notice that acquisition program performance is of significant 
interest. The DoD’s portfolio of acquisition programs continues to grow as its cost 
and schedule performance deteriorates.27  The GAO is unlikely to lessen its 
emphasis in this area. Given the controversy surrounding the National Security 
Personnel System, the aging workforce, and matters of recruitment and retention of 
the uniformed forces, we can expect HR to also remain a frequent topic. There have 
been downward trends in the frequency of reviews in the areas of financial 
management, budgeting and government-wide performance measurement. Should 
the next administration replace the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) and 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)—and it is very likely that a Democratic 
administration will—one can expect the GAO to assess the efficacy of the new 
programs just as it did the PMA and PART during the Bush Administration.  
When the GAO is interested in government management reform, the DoD is a 
likely subject. This is probably due to the scope of the DoD’s imprint in terms of 
dollars spent and personnel employed combined with its large presence on the 
GAO’s High Risk list.28  However, when the GAO looks at the DoD, it is more 
interested in the performance of acquisition programs and personnel matters, 
probably due to the significant amount of resources in those areas. The war will 
continue to get attention. And due to war casualties and the nationwide trend in 
rising health care costs, so will medical matters. In addition, both presidential 
                                            
26 Compiled from GAO annual Performance and Accountability Reports for years 2007, 2005, and 
2001: Government Accountability Office. (2001, 2005, 2007). Performance and accountability report.  
Retrieved July 24, 2008, from http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1SP 
27 Congressional Budget Office. (2007, December). Long-term implications of current defense plans: 
Summary update for fiscal year 2008. Washington, DC: Author; Government Accountability Office. 
(2008, March). Defense acquisitions: Assessment of selected weapons programs report (GAO-08-
467SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
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candidates have emphasized reforming contracting practices, which could lead to 
additional evaluation and oversight in that area. 
2. Academics and Practitioners 
In an election year, those who follow the business of government will make 
their views known. Whether they are suggesting policy changes in areas that are 
important to them, forecasting the events to come, or simply informing everyone with 
a stake in the transition, much is written about the topic. We have looked through the 
writings of both academics and practitioners (we will refer to them collectively as 
pundits) related to management reform and the transition. We find two themes: 
those that predict the issues that will be important to the new president and those 
that suggest courses of action for the next administration. Of course, there is plenty 
of overlap between the two sets. 
What do the pundits say will be the management issues that confront the next 
president? Donald Kettl (University of Pennsylvania) and Steve Kelman (Harvard) 
were among the first out of the gate, writing a pair of essays for the IBM Center for 
the Business of Government in 2005 and 2006, respectively, under the mantle 
“reflections on 21st century management.” Kettl argued there are five imperatives 
facing the next administration (emphases in original):  
 A policy agenda that focuses more on problems than on structures 
 Political accountability that works more through results than on 
processes 
 Public administration that functions more organically, through 
networks, than rigidly, through hierarchy 
 Political leadership that works more by leveraging action than simply 
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 Citizenship that works more through engagement than remoteness.29  
Kettl envisions an administration that is further confronted with the complexity 
and demands of modern society: that problems and results are the focus, not the 
structures and bureaus of government; that effective solutions require a network of 
actors both inside and outside government; that government is more about 
facilitating that network than attempting to produce results exclusively; and that 
citizens expect to be more substantively engaged. To paraphrase, the issues are too 
complex, and the nuances too great, for a leviathan government to solve them on its 
own.  
In his companion piece, Kelman warns of the risk of becoming preoccupied 
with ferreting out waste, fraud and abuse, exposing mismanagement, and complying 
with rules and procedures. He sees trends similar to Kettl’s facing the next 
administration: a greater emphasis on performance measurement and management, 
a need for improved contract management and interorganizational collaboration; 
demands for more choice and competition; and the pressure for efficiency-promoting 
budget reforms.30  
Of course, all this occurs at a time when the fiscal outlook of the nation is 
bleak: baby boomers are just reaching retirement age, and there will be marked 
increases in Social Security and Medicare demands for the next two decades as 
their contributions into those funds diminishes. The national debt is over $9 trillion, 
and of the $5 trillion that is publicly held, over half is now held overseas. The S&P 
                                            
29 Kettl, D.F. (2005). The next government of the United States: Challenges for performance in the 
21st century. In Reflections on 21st century government management (2008 Presidential Transition 
Series) (pp. 7-32).  Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. Retrieved July 24, 
2008, from http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/KettlKelmanReport.pdf 
30 Kelman, S. (2006). The transformation of government in the decade ahead. In Reflections on 21st 
century government management (2008 Presidential Transition Series) (pp. 33-63). Washington, DC: 
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500 index is lower than when Bush first assumed office. The economy is in or is on 
the brink of a recession. 
What should the next president do given this environment, these trends, and 
those expectations?  In a more recent piece, Kettl offers recommendations along 
four tracks: fiscal, personnel, performance, and priorities.31 First, considering the 
fiscal picture, he recommends a comprehensive federal fiscal policy that seeks to 
remedy the imbalance between expected revenues and outlays. He also suggests 
greater emphasis on performance management—the ability to link program results 
to budgets. Second, in the domain of personnel policies, he suggests expanding civil 
service reform beyond the DoD and the DHS to the entire federal government and to 
do so in a manner that addresses the “crisis of competence” facing the government 
as the baby boomers in public service retire. He also recommends reducing the 
number of political appointees and effecting policies that address the revolving door 
between special interest groups and government. Third, he feels the new 
administration should focus on performance, “forging ahead with positive reforms 
from the Clinton and Bush administrations, and looking to lessons from the past to 
determine what government ought to do differently.” Fourth, he suggests the next 
president should prioritize his attention, focusing on those items on the GAO High 
Risk list, especially outsourcing and contract management.32  
In a piece looking specifically at the defense department, Kurt Campbell and 
Michèlle Flournoy (both former defense department political appointees) outline 
defense-related matters a new administration should do to address the “complex mix 
of challenges and opportunities [presented by] the war, military overextensions, 
                                            
31 Kettl, D.F. (2008, January 1). Advice + dissent: Viewpoint fixing the future. Government Executive, 
40. 
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strategic preoccupation and public disillusionment.”33  They cite a need to restore US 
moral authority and credibility, primarily by demonstrating recognition that alliances, 
partnerships and coalitions are necessary. They also urge a revitalization of the US 
military to ease the strain on the force, to adapt to new threats, and to rethink when it 
is appropriate to use force.34  
Looking specifically at the management side of DoD, Pete Singer writing for 
Brookings’ Opportunity 08 series presents his own list of issues that merit attention 
by the next administration. His list is representative of what many have said in this 
domain: the force is stretched thin, but not broken, and needs to be the focus of a 
multi-pronged approach.  Regarding personnel, he suggests halting the outsourcing 
of critical functions, recruiting a force that is more representative of the US 
population, and halting the decline in recruiting standards. Regarding equipment, he 
notes the importance of resetting the force, including the restoration of pre-
positioned materials and the capacity to respond to natural disasters in the 
homeland. He also suggests a reevaluation of the acquisition portfolio. Regarding 
processes, he suggests a reform of the acquisition process—to include a better 
integration of requirements with budgets and the evaluation of acquisition program 
management. He also suggests ending the abuse of supplemental appropriations.35  
To summarize, the pundits see an increasingly complex context for defense 
business management, but believe the trends in public management over the past 
several years should continue: a focus on results rather than on processes, reliance 
on networks of governmental and non-governmental actors, greater transparency 
                                            
33 Campbell, K.M., & Flournoy, M.A. (2007, June). The inheritance and the way forward. Washington, 
DC: Center for a New American Security, pp. 3-4. 
34 Campbell, K.M., & Flournoy, M.A. (2007, June). 
35 Singer, P.W. (2008). Bent but not broken: The military challenge for the next commander-in-chief. 
In Opportunity 08: Independent ideas for our next president. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
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and performance management. The pundits suggest the next administration focus 
its management reform agendas on these areas of particular concern to the DoD: 
 Performance management—linking resources to measurable results 
and increasing program evaluation proficiency, with special emphasis 
on the materiel component of resetting the force and ensuring 
readiness across a wider spectrum of operations; 
 Transparency and accountability—promulgating performance 
information, more open processes and shared data, and less reliance 
on contractors in policy-making areas; 
 Personnel—continued attention to civil service reform and managing 
the exodus of experienced civilian workers; recruitment, retention and 
utilization of the uniformed force; 
 Contracting & Acquisition—limiting the portfolio of new systems while 
also improving contract-administration proficiency. 
D. The Reform Trajectory 
Considering the DoD’s history, the trends from the GAO’s work, and the views 
of the pundits, what do we believe are the areas of emphasis for defense reform that 
will confront the president in the first years of the next administration?  Our findings 
are presented on three dimensions. The first dimension is the functional area to be 
reformed. We suggest the four most important are contracting & acquisition, 
managing human resources, maintaining mission readiness, and evolving the mix of 
capabilities. The second dimension is the perspective of reform, of which there are 
five: program effectiveness, transparency & accountability, business process 
improvement, organizational & structural, and financial management. The third 
dimension is the relative degree of emphasis for each of the pairings along the first 
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Figure 6. The Reform Trajectory Facing the Next Administration 
The functional area we expect will continue to receive the greatest attention is 
contracting and acquisition. The GAO has stressed this area; past defense 
secretaries have made it a priority; it is a hot topic in Congress, and the candidates 
have made it an issue. Contracting and acquisition will be highly emphasized from 
the reform perspectives of program effectiveness, transparency and accountability, 
and business process improvement. One can expect to see another wave of 
acquisition reform initiatives to address cost growth and schedule delays. One can 
expect to see more competition and stricter oversight. Of slightly lesser concern is 
the human capital dimension of acquisition—it is widely recognized there are 
insufficient numbers of government employees managing acquisition and overseeing 
contracts, and there may be concerns about the extant workforce’s competency in 
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Other critical areas of reform emphasis include transparency and 
accountability for human resource management and the effectiveness of recent HR 
reforms. The National Security Personnel System will continue to receive attention, 
and both the DoD and the DHS reforms will be reconsidered in light of broader civil 
service reform. Attention will be paid to addressing the existing and pending 
competency gaps within the government workforce. The rising cost and policy issues 
surrounding the recruiting, training, equipping and retaining the uniformed force will 
continue to garner attention.  
The next critical area is maintaining current readiness—there is widespread 
concern about the effects on readiness of the Iraq war. From resetting the force to 
resting the fatigued ground forces, the next administration must pay attention to the 
human, materiel, and fiscal aspects of ensuring readiness. We also expect attention 
to be paid to the mix of capabilities the Department should possess—from the roles 
and missions study currently underway to the upcoming quadrennial review, the next 
administration will question what the DoD ought to be able to do. 
From a reform perspective, the three areas that will be emphasized are 
program effectiveness, transparency and accountability, and process improvement. 
Current efforts to measure program outcomes and results will continue—this is a 
trend common across all levels of government, and pressure will continue for the 
DoD to improve its ability to measure and manage programmatic results. Both 
presidential candidates have campaigned on pledges to increase transparency and 
accountability. We expect to see more information made public on results and the 
underlying processes of government. While we expect Lean Six Sigma and other 
specific programs closely associated with the present administration to be replaced, 
the spirit behind those reforms should remain: more efficient and reliable processes. 
Historically, there has been a tendency for new administrations to employ the tools 
of the organizational and structural perspective (especially changing the “wiring 
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3. Governance of Reform  
“Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their 
own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” 
James Madison36 
In addition to addressing the topics and trajectory of management reform, a 
report on management reform in the midst of governmental transition must 
necessarily draw the distinction between management and governance.  Larry Lynn 
and Carolyn Heinrich define governance as "regimes of laws, administrative rules, 
judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government 
activity, where such activity is broadly defined as the production and delivery of 
publicly supported goods and services."37 Management reform is about adjusting the 
mechanisms involved in the activities of producing goods and services: acquisition, 
financial management, human resources, etc. Governance is about the context in 
which that management occurs: those things that constrain, prescribe and enable 
that management activity. Governance originates in legislation, executive orders, or 
the direction of the executive layers of command. This section examines the 
governance structure of today’s defense business reform initiatives. 
A. Evolution of Management Reform Governance 
At the start of the G. W. Bush Administration, business transformation in the 
DoD was governed by the Business Practices Implementation Board, an advisory 
panel consisting of private-sector executives and other senior-level management 
reform committees. By the middle of 2001, however, more permanent governance 
                                            
36 Madison, J. (1987). Letter to W.T. Barry. In G. Hunt (Ed.), The writings of James Madison (pp. 103-
109). (Vol. 9). New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Retrieved August 12, 2008, from http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html 
37 Lynn, L., & Heinrich, C. (2000). Governance and performance: New perspectives. Washington, DC: 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 32 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
structures for transformation began to appear.  First, Rumsfeld established the 
Financial Management Modernization Program to oversee the development of new 
financial management systems and processes. In 2003, the Business Management 
Modernization Program (BMMP) expanded the scope of business transformation 
beyond financial systems to include non-financial management systems and 
processes. Thus, in recognition of the broader mission, responsibility shifted from 
USD(C) to USD (AT&L).  
Congressional mandates have also driven the governance of business 
transformation in the DoD. In the NDAA for FY 2005, Congress required the DoD to 
establish the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to oversee and 
coordinate investments in information technology. At the same time, the BMMP was 
replaced by the Defense Business Transformation Agency (DBTA), a permanent 
office in OSD to institutionalize, lead and manage a broad portfolio of transformation 
activities in functional areas (such as acquisition, financial management, human 
resources, and supply chain management) and to exercise oversight over 18 
enterprise-wide business programs. The DBTA is also responsible for maintaining 
the Department’s Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA), “the enterprise 
architecture for the Department of Defense’s business information infrastructure 
processes, data, standards, business rules, operating requirements, and information 
exchange,”38 and the Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP), the Department’s roadmap 
for business transformation.  Both the BEA and the ETP were mandated by 
Congress in the 2005 NDAA.  
Senior-level governance of business activities in the Department was 
assigned to the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG) in DoD directives of 
2006 and 2008. It is responsible for “matters pertaining to DoD enterprise 
management, business transformation, and operations; and strategic level 
                                            
38 Defense Business Transformation Agency. (2006). Defense business transformation. Retrieved 
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coordination and integration of planning, programming, budgeting, execution and 
assessment activities of the Department.”39  
In 2008, Congress assigned the role of Chief Management Officer (CMO) to 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the under secretaries of the service 
components. In 2008, Congress also created the position of Deputy Chief 
Management Officer (DCMO) in the OSD, and the pending FY 2009 NDAA would 
mandate Business Transformation Offices in each of the services. Finally, also in 
2008, a White House executive order directed all federal agencies to designate a 
Performance Improvement Officer to oversee performance improvement measures.  
The PIO’s work will almost surely occur in coordination with the CMO and business 
transformation efforts. 
Table 2. Evolution of Business Transformation Governance 
 
2001 Business Transformation Implementation Board 
2001 Defense Business Board 
2001 Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP) 
2003 Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) 
2005 Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) 
2005 Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) 
DoD Chief Management Officer 
2006  Deputy’s Advisory Working Group 
2008 DoD Deputy Chief Management Officer 
Service Component Chief Management Officers 
2008 Performance Improvement Officer 
2009 (Proposed) Service Component Business Transformation Offices 
___________________________________________________________________ 
                                            
39 Department of Defense. (2008, May 19). DoD senior governance councils (Department of Defense 
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B. Transition Considerations for Governance of Defense 
Management Reform 
Three observations can be drawn from the above examination of business 
transformation in the DoD from 2001 to 2008 that are relevant for the transition.  
First, the outgoing administration has worked its way through an exhaustive (and 
perhaps exhausting) evolution in business transformation. Beginning with a 
straightforward attempt to address financial systems, the DoD’s leaders soon 
perceived that the management problems of the Department could not be addressed 
simply by fixing financial systems and improving financial information management. 
Instead, a great deal of work has been done to define business activities and to 
identify portfolios of transformation initiatives.  It was recognized that efforts in the 
1990s successfully reformed much of the “back office” financial management 
concerns through the DMRs and the establishment of the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service. Further reforms were necessarily interdependent—finance 
could not be separated from acquisition or logistics or human resources. A more 
integrated and enterprise-wide approach was necessary. Thus, enterprise-wide 
governance bodies and processes have evolved and are largely now part of the 
operating fabric of the Department. Much of this approach is managed and 
supported by the permanent bureaucracy and is sustainable through transition and 
into the new administration.40 The Department’s incoming leaders would be well 
advised not to overturn these institutions and processes simply because they belong 
to the outgoing administration. Instead, a policy that allows the short-term adoption 
of current practices and a longer-term review and alteration as needed would avoid 
the usual pattern of broken transitions in management reform. Starting over is costly, 
disruptive and inefficient. 
                                            
40 For an excellent summary of the history and strategic design of business transformation in DoD 
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Second, all the evidence points to Congress’ continuing active interest in the 
improvement of business management in the Department of Defense. Congress has 
required defense officials to testify about transformation, has required various 
reports, and it has directed new processes and organizations. It is not likely that this 
active Congressional oversight will abate. In fact, it is more likely that the 
Department’s new leaders will be called to hearings early in 2009 to address their 
plans for business management reform. For some members of Congress, this is 
important enough to make part of the confirmation hearings. So, even if the incoming 
team is not especially inclined toward making management matters a high priority, it 
is likely that Congress will make them such. If so, a case can be made for the new 
team to build on the work of its predecessors. 
Third, the areas of concentration for management transformation are 
enduring.  The new team will find that it must address persistent management issues 
in acquisition and contracting, financial management, human capital management 
and logistics. GAO reports and Congressional oversight will compel effort in these 
areas.  Again, initiatives that have been in development for years are underway and 
should not be ignored or discarded before an objective analysis can be made of their 
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4. Presidential Transitions 
 
“[P]ower is not automatically transferred, but must be seized. Only the 
authority of the presidency is transferred on January 20; the power of the 
presidency—in terms of effective control of the policy agenda—must be 
consciously developed.”    
 James Pfiffner41  
 
There has not been an open presidential election since 1952. By “open” we 
mean that neither the sitting president nor the sitting vice-president is running for 
president, leaving no heir-apparent. We can be sure that, whatever the outcome in 
November, some non-trivial amount of change will occur after the election. The 
incoming team will need to be prepared to initiate that change. Federal departments 
and agencies need to be prepared to accept it and implement it. This is a most 
unique process in America: the periodic and peaceful exchange of one government 
for another and the metamorphosis of candidates to presidents.  
 The description that follows employs a chronological approach: pre-election, 
the interregnum, and the post-inaugural period. The description is provided from 
three perspectives, that of the outgoing administration, the incoming administration, 
and the career executives who serve under both. Within that description, attention is 
given to the Defense Department and how it can best prepare for the inevitable 
change, even when the exact nature of the change is unknowable. 
A. Pre-election Transition 
Well before the election, transition activities begin. The candidates create 
transition teams that complement their campaign teams. The outgoing administration 
                                            
41 Pfiffner, J.P. (1996). The strategic presidency: Hitting the ground running (2nd ed). Lawrence: 
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seeks to ensure its legacy while making preparations for transition. The career 
executives implement the transition plans and agendas of the outgoing 
administration while preparing for the inevitable change. 
1. The Presidential Candidates 
Contemporary American politics expects a significant amount from a 
president’s first 100 days in office. As there are several major holidays during the 
eleven short weeks between election and inauguration, preparations for transition 
must occur well before the election.42  
Campaigning and governing are different. Effective campaigning before the 
election accentuates the differences between candidates, between parties, and 
between policy agendas. It has a short-term focus, is competitive, and has a discrete 
outcome. On the other hand, effective governing involves consensus building, 
coalition forming and cooperation. Compromise, not competition, is essential. 
Decisions are not either-or; there are infinite possible outcomes. The focus is 
deliberate and long-term. These attributes necessarily involve different sets of skills 
and demand different advice and counsel and staff support. Administrations that 
effectively transition recognize this difference and deliberately manage the 
conversion.     
While Presidents Wilson and Harding each took a month off to rest after their 
elections before turning attention to their new duties,43 George W. Bush began his 
transition in the spring of 1999.44  No doubt, Senators Obama and McCain have 
                                            
42 Pfiffner, J.P. (1996); Kumar, M.J., & Sullivan, T. (2003). The White House world: Transitions, 
organization, and office operations. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. 
43 Pfiffner, J.P. (forthcoming, 2009). Presidential transitions. In G.C. Edwards & W. Howell (Eds.), 
Oxford handbook of the American Presidency (pagination not yet known). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
44 Johnson, C. (2002). The 2000-01 presidential transition: Planning, goals and reality. PS: Political 
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already begun their transition efforts as this is being typed in June 2008. Of course, 
one of the candidates is laboring in vain, but the opportunity cost of not preparing 
this far in advance is great. Modern transitions have grown significantly in 
complexity. While Eisenhower employed approximately 100 people on his transition 
team, Bush (43) employed 800 people and spent $8.5 million.45  During the pre-
election period, the candidates will organize for transition and develop a prospective 
policy agenda and implementation plan. 
The more effective pre-election transition teams are organized apart from the 
campaign team, but actions of the two groups are closely coordinated. The 
leadership of the transition team is often comprised of Washington insiders—those 
with experience with the operation of a White House, the significant cabinet 
agencies, foreign and domestic policy, and the legislature. Understanding how 
Washington works is vital since this is the team that is foremost responsible for the 
transition from campaigning to governing. Andrew Card, for example, participated in 
the Bush (41) in-transition and led the 1992 out-transition; he was then selected as 
the Bush (43) White House Chief of Staff weeks before the 2000 election. James 
Baker led the 1980 transition team after being designated presumptive Chief of Staff 
before the election.46  
The policy work of the transition team can be effectively organized in different 
ways. The Bush (43) team was primarily organized along government department 
lines. Clinton’s team was a matrix with “Executive Branch agency clusters” and 
cross-cutting “policy departments”—including health, budget, economy, domestic 
                                            
45 Johnson, C. (2002). 
46 Burke, J.P. (2001).  Lessons from past presidential transitions: Organization, management, and 
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and foreign departments, all reporting to a transition board.47  Clinton’s transition 
team structure is depicted in Figure 7.48 
 
Figure 7. Clinton Team Transition Model of Matrix Relationships 
Policy positions may be based in the candidate’s own ideals; they may be 
planks in the party platform; they may be contemporary issues in the media or in the 
public eye, and they may originate outside the party by interest groups who seek an 
ally. Reagan’s economic policy agenda was heavily influenced by the Heritage 
Foundation, for example.49  
In addition to formulating the policy ideas, new administrations must develop 
implementation strategies, of which there are two main types. First, the 
administration must be equipped to implement those they are solely empowered to 
                                            
47 Bruce, R.R. (1996). The succession of the president and the vice president: Managing the change. 
Public Administration Quarterly, 20(1), 26-51. 
48 Bruce, R.R. (1996), p. 38. 
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effect, such as through agency reorganization or executive orders. Second, when 
legislation is necessary, the administration must prepare to draft legislative 
proposals and align the political capital to enact them. Advanced planning is 
necessary to craft that agenda and create the necessary capabilities. It is important 
to note that a large part of that capability comes in the form of the personnel that 
were designated for cabinet and sub-cabinet positions. Designating personnel and 
developing policy are interdependent processes50 and will be discussed later.   
2. The Outgoing Administration 
Incumbent political leaders are working hard to ensure a legacy for their 
administration. The clock is ticking; the candidates are garnering much of the 
attention from the media, but the work of government continues. Certain items on 
the incumbent’s agenda will be incomplete, and they will strive to finish them. 
As early as August 2007, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 
issued a memorandum to departmental leaders listing 25 goals for which “the end 
objective is to complete or advance to a major milestone […] and also to have them 
institutionalized by December, 2008.”51  The list was briefed to President Bush before 
being published.52  While some were related to operational issues such as the war in 
Iraq and the military detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, others were related 
to management reform in financial management and acquisition.  
One tool for ensuring the legacy of the outgoing team is the annual budget. 
The outgoing administration will prepare the subsequent year’s budget to a lesser 
degree of detail than normal and will hand it to the incoming administration shortly 
                                            
50 Pfiffner, J.P. (forthcoming, 2009).  
51 England, G. (2007, August 9). DoD transformation priorities. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Memorandum. Washington, DC: Author. 
52 Roberts, K. (2007, August 20). Pentagon sets goals to hit before end of Bush term. Reuters. 
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after the election. They want to ensure their policy preferences are represented and 
know that the incoming team—likely inexperienced and pressed for time—will be 
forced to accept most of it.  The plan in 2008 is to do essentially that: the Office of 
Management and Budget has tasked each agency to prepare a basic budget by 
early November reflecting Bush Administration priorities to hand to the president-
elect.  
One responsibility of the outgoing administration is to minimize a “leadership 
vacuum” during transition. The outgoing administration has a responsibility for the 
orderly transition of authority. Funds are budgeted under the authorities of the 
Presidential Transition Acts and guidance is issued to the White House staff and 
agencies regarding transition activities. As officials leave the outgoing 
administration, plans are made to move career officials into acting positions to 
assure continuity of leadership during the transition 
3. The Career Executives 
About the time that campaigning becomes a staple of the evening news, 
career executives53 within federal agencies begin to consider the effects of the 
transition on the policy direction of their agencies and the management decisions 
they face in the remaining months of the present administration. They also begin to 
think about the possible futures that confront them, both on a personal and 
professional level. Because 2008 is an open contest, someone unaffiliated with the 
present administration will be the next president—even the in-party candidate has 
significant ideological differences with the sitting president. Preparation for inevitable 
change has certain predictable characteristics. 
Little work is done in anticipation of any specific candidate, but general 
preparations begin. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the 
                                            





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 43 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
transition would be challenging, and the country is vulnerable to being tested 
militarily. He predicted the transition would not be smooth and was quoted in April 
2008 saying, “There are very few either briefings or meetings that I’m in that I’m not 
thinking about ‘How does what we’re talking about right now transition to next 
spring?’”54  
Installing new appointees is a function for the White House personnel office, 
but a successful installation also requires some work on the part of each agency. 
Months ahead of the election, staff elements such as the Office of Deputy for 
Administration and Management at OSD will study the files of past transitions and 
develop lists of things necessary to effect smooth installations: personnel 
administrative tasks, security clearances, and indoctrination training on critical 
processes and organizational relationships.  
B. The Interregnum 
Once the election is over and a President-elect identified, the transition 
becomes more public—and the incoming team, the outgoing team, and the 
bureaucracy begin to interact. The rhetoric of the campaign trail turns to the rhetoric 
of governance and the delivery of campaign promises. The incoming administration 
establishes a presence in Washington, and the media seek information about the 
make-up of the new team to satisfy the public’s growing curiosity. Members of the 
new administration gather information about the critical issues and processes, refine 
their policy agenda, and make personnel selections. The outgoing administration 
and the bureaucracy formalize preparations for change now that the nature of that 
change is better understood. But while the outgoing administration is ensuring its 
legacy and preparing to depart, the career workforce is paradoxically the stabilizing 
force that keeps government functioning while bracing for inevitable change. 
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Given the complexity of the transition of a modern presidency, monetary and 
in-kind support is available to the President-elect and to the outgoing team. Under 
the provisions of the Presidential Transition Acts of 1963 and 2000, funds are 
authorized for transition support to include federal office space, office staff, 
telecommunications, travel, hiring consultants, and the orientation of new 
appointees. Funds are available from Election Day until 30 days after inauguration. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) plays a significant role in transition 
planning and management—including the compilation and publication of transition 
directories for the incoming team, with information about each federal agency and 
department.55  In the 2009 budget, the GSA requested $8.5 million for the 
presidential transition, including $5.3 million for the incoming administration, $2.2 
million for the outgoing administration, and $1 million for costs related to the 
orientation of key appointees of the incoming president.56  
1. The Incoming Administration 
Immediately after the election, the President-elect’s transition teams will 
descend on Washington and appear inside Executive agencies and departments. 
While the agencies have been preparing briefing materials for the transition team, it 
is common that the team will request additional information.  Figure 8 contains an 
outline of typical briefing book content. Depending on the structure of the transition 
team (departmental, policy area, or matrixed) and depending on its need for data, 
there may be several requests for information from the agencies. On the other hand, 
there may be surprisingly little coordination, depending on the level of trust among 
the transition team, the outgoing team and the bureaucracy. The transition team may 
instead rely on its own staff, consultants, and think tanks for information. The 
                                            
55 Smith, S. (2007, December 27). Presidential transitions (RL30736). CRS Report for Congress. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
56 Office of Management and Budget. (2008). Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
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transition team’s goals are to understand the state of affairs of the agencies, to 
understand the critical processes that operate within them, to understand and take a 
position on current and near-term issues confronting them, and to refine the strategic 
direction, policy positions, and policy-implementation strategies moving forward. 
Figure 8. Transition Briefing Book (Notional Contents)57 
 
 Statement of the functions and mission of the organization 
 Summary of authorizing legislation 
 Current agency/department strategy documents, goals, objectives, 
and status 
 Last year’s performance information (e.g., PART) 
 Organization Chart 
 List of key personnel at headquarters and in the field with contact 
information 
 List of significant agency or department alumni (both political and 
career) by position with contact information 
 List of significant directives 
 List of major decisions in the past 3-6 months 
 List of issues pending decision in the next 3-6 months 
 List of recent reports and in-progress work by the Inspector 
General, Government Accountability Office, advisory boards, 
committees, or commissions 
 List of reports and documents scheduled for release in the next 3-6 
months 
 Summaries of pending legal issues and court cases 
 List of key constituency groups, including Congressional 
committees and subcommittees 
 Status of bureau internal controls 
 Problem areas political designees should be aware of prior to 
confirmation hearings 
 
                                            
57 Adapted from Hamilton, M.S. (1996). The career service and presidential transition: From Bush to 
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In addition to gathering information from the bureaucracy, the transition team 
and executive designees have an important resource in the incumbent political team. 
In hindsight, nearly every administration wishes it had sought more advice and 
knowledge from the incumbent, but after a year or more of drawing distinctions 
between themselves on the campaign trail, mistrust is high and feelings are sore. 
Outgoing administrations understand their tenure is nearing the end; they want their 
successes to carry forward, but they may or may not genuinely want to help their 
successors. The incoming team tends to suffer from hubris and naïveté and may not 
be prone to listen to their predecessors. The nature of partisan politics (if the out-
party wins) and the nature of campaigns is such that the transfer of knowledge is 
likely to be very incomplete.58  
Another critical resource to the incoming administration is the career 
workforce. The career executives possess critical knowledge to help formulate new 
policy, and they are the only ones who can ensure its implementation. Most career 
executives pride themselves on maintaining a position of neutral competence. They 
know that the political leadership sets the agenda and that their role is to provide 
advice and to implement it. With an election, change is expected. They will sense an 
obligation to educate the new political leadership on contemporary issues and critical 
bureaucratic processes, including being forthright about what is working and what is 
not.  
In addition to becoming informed and refining policy position, the incoming 
team is preparing to put its team members in place. Key personnel selections to fill 
cabinet and sub-cabinet level positions take from weeks to months to vet—including 
background and ethics reviews, nomination, and confirmation. With approximately 
4,000 appointments to make, the new president’s personnel office must be 
competent and ready on the first day. Both 2008 candidates have stressed a desire 
to limit the influence of the “revolving door” during their campaigns and are expected 
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to carefully manage the appointment process. All seek to avoid an embarrassing 
personnel matter that could distract from the policy agenda in the early weeks of the 
administration or which could serve to limit or consume their political capital. Recent 
proposals to allow the confirmation hearing process to begin during the interregnum, 
if enacted, may accelerate the process. 
Establishing a personnel-selection philosophy and supporting process is 
among the most important first steps the transition team takes. Some presidents 
attempt to manage the Executive Branch with a strong hand from the White House, 
like Nixon, whereas others take a more decentralized approach, like Carter. Reagan 
and Bush (43) chose appointees who were ideologically aligned; Clinton favored 
technical competence and diversity over ideology. Knowing the preferences of the 
presidential candidate, the transition team will design a process to accept 
nominations and applications and then to process them for most effective placement 
in the administration. Candidates come from the campaign, the executive career 
workforce, from Congress and its agencies (including former members of Congress 
and Congressional staff members), from the business community, or nonprofit 
groups and academia. When the election results in a change of party, the 
“government in exile”—former political appointees from the newly elected party—
comes forward to fill critical roles. Don Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney are two 
contemporary examples of that phenomenon. The personnel process must be robust 
as tens of thousands of applications are likely to arrive immediately after the 
election. Clinton asked everyone involved in the transition for a resume, solicited 
more, and accepted unsolicited ones, resulting in a database of 200,000.59  Bush 
(43) took a more limited approach but still received “about 40,000 in a few weeks 
time.”60  
                                            
59 Bruce, R.R. (1996).  
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2. The Outgoing Administration 
While the President-elect is building the new government and shaping the 
new administration’s agenda, the outgoing president is facilitating the orderly 
transition. In 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13176 which provided 
guidance to the Executive Branch on facilitating the transition to his successor. He 
established a Presidential Transition Coordinating Council chaired by his Chief of 
Staff, instructed the GSA and the Office of Government Ethics to conduct 
orientations for the new team and to otherwise implement the provisions of the 
Presidential Transition Act.  He also instructed the departments and agencies to 
prepare briefing materials to the incoming team.61  But the outgoing president is not 
only facilitating a transfer, he is acting to ensure his legacy. 
Despite the moniker “lame duck,” the sitting president is hardly without power. 
While the transition has been characterized as a period when the president’s 
authority is like “a large balloon with a slow leak,”62 evidence shows that there is a 
spike of activity by the outgoing team, ostensibly to ensure its legacy in particular 
policy areas. As Howell and Mayer describe it, “The president’s capacity to 
negotiate, broker deals, and ultimately persuade is, at last, depleted. His power, 
however, is not.”63 That power is sometimes wielded through unilateral actions such 
as executive orders, especially when the out-party succeeds the in-party.64  
Research shows that outgoing presidents also issue more executive orders during 
states of war, when the president is relatively unpopular, and the economy is weak, 
                                            
61 Clinton, W.J. (2000, November 27). Facilitation of a presidential transition (Presidential Executive 
Order 13176). Washington, DC: Author.  
62 Pfiffner, J.P. (1996), p. 5. 
63 Howell, W.G., & Mayer, K.R. (2005). The last one hundred days. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 
35(3), 533-553, p. 537. 
64 Mayer, K., & Price, K. (2002). Unilateral presidential powers: Significant executive orders, 1949-
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all conditions we face in 2008.65 New rules and regulations are also issued, as 
evidenced by an increase in pages in the Federal Register.66  Such orders and rules 
may constrain the incoming president, especially if there is a political cost to undoing 
them, as Bush (43) discovered when attempting to reverse the clean water 
standards for arsenic that Clinton approved three days before leaving office.  
There are a few other ways the outgoing administration may attempt to 
secure its legacy. Joseph Zentner studied the perpetuation of housing programs 
across the Johnson-Nixon transition. The Johnson Administration used the budget 
which the incoming team had little time to adjust. They created bureaucratic 
momentum through renewed emphasis. Conversely, by giving up something small to 
the incoming team, they defused Nixon’s counter-agenda.67 The outgoing 
administration may even award major contracts, even prematurely, to keep a 
program alive if the incoming team has threatened to slow or stop it. It is harder to 
undo a contract than not to sign it at all.  
Many of those actions, of course, are implemented by the career workforce—
some of whom may welcome those tactics if it keeps their program or policy intact. 
Others will be frustrated by the hasty and potentially wasteful decisions. But most of 
those decisions are not made by the career workforce—they act as agents of the 
still-legitimate political leadership.  
                                            
65 Mayer, K. (1972) “Executive Orders and Presidential Power,” The Journal of Politics, 61 (1999): 
445-466 and Krause, G.A. and Cohen, J.E. (2000) “Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of 
the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-96,” The Journal of Politics, 62 
(1): 88-114. 
66 Howell, W.G., & Mayer, K.R. (2005). 
67 Zentner, J.L. (1972). Presidential transitions and the perpetuation of programs: The Johnson-Nixon 
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3. The Career Executives 
Loyalty and subordination deserve mention. While civilian agencies 
experience changes in political leadership infrequently; career employees in the DoD 
have a heightened understanding of what is involved in a change at the top. Their 
loyalty tends to the position, not the individual. Admirals and generals come and go 
in elaborate ceremonies that rival presidential inaugurations. Power and authority, 
and the organization’s respect and compliance, are transferred instantaneously; they 
are not transitioned gradually. While the transition team for the incoming 
administration will witness loyalty to the Bush Administration until January 20th, that 
loyalty is not so much evidence of ideological alignment and a problem for the new 
team; rather it is a signal from the uniformed and civilian career workforce of the type 
of loyalty that awaits the new team.  
This is not just a time of political change; it is a time of organizational change, 
and the career executives need to be cognizant of, and actively manage, the change 
that confronts them. Typically, organizations respond to an externally driven change 
by becoming more rigid and task-oriented. The exact nature of externally driven 
change is unknown, so the members of the organization gravitate towards the 
familiar and comfortable. They focus on their daily work and enduring relationships. 
There is less risk-taking and a higher need for control. Authority is centralized, and 
the organization becomes rigid from increased group cohesion. Ironically, this is just 
when the organization most needs to be flexible to cope with the change. Just as 
one’s body tenses before an imminent traffic accident, so does an organization in 
anticipation of the external shock of transition.68  
Individually, the career executives may be anxious about the coming change. 
Roles will change; the relative importance of functions within the department or 
                                            
68 Zentner, J.L. (1972); Hall, D.T., & Mansfield, R. (1971). Organizational and individual responses to 
external stress. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16(4), 533-547; Gaertner, G.H., & Gaertner, K.N., & 
Devine, I. (1983). Federal agencies in the context of transition: A contrast between democratic and 
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agency will shift; once-important programs may be scaled back or cancelled, and the 
nature of the next political boss is unknown. The comfort of the known is replaced 
with the uncertainty of the unknown. Communication patterns change, and centers 
of influence diminish. This is especially pronounced if inter- and intra-organizational 
relationships depend heavily on the personalities of the political appointees. There 
may be a general lack of trust if the incoming administration is rumored to hold the 
agency out of favor. Just at the time career executives need to position themselves 
to fill the leadership vacuum between inauguration and installation of the new 
political team, they risk becoming more self-centered and potentially less committed 
to the agency.69  
While the agency executives’ attention shifts to the new administration’s 
needs, routine work may pile up. It should be delegated to the lower levels of the 
organization who may find comfort in the routine work during this time of change.  
History shows that while the new administration is impatient to implement its 
agenda, the prospect of change renders the bureaucracy less capable of responding 
to those needs. Thus, we find two strains on the bureaucracy: one between a need 
to be responsive and a tendency to become rigid, and another between the inherent 
continuity of a bureaucracy and the need for it to change.70 The strain is particularly 
pronounced when the incoming team establishes a policy position antithetical to the 
one that has been operating—as was the case with the housing policy when Nixon 
became president, and with Reagan and the EPA. We can expect that there will be 
stresses in the DoD in 2009, but they will not be so much a case of loyalty to the old 
regime as much as a case of organizational change management.  
There is another concern, however, unique to the DoD. National security 
analysis suggests that acts of terrorism are more likely to occur around the time of 
                                            
69 Gaertner, G.H., & Gaertner, K.N., & Devine, I. (1983).  
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elections so the terrorists can influence the result. They may also occur around the 
time of transition to test the lame duck or new regime. So, in addition to the tasks of 
setting up shop and establishing policy, those in the DoD must be careful to maintain 
vigilance, must clearly understand the chain of command, and be prepared at all 
times if called to respond to a crisis. 
C. Post-inauguration 
Whereas Election Day was the point of demarcation between campaigning 
and the transition to governing, the Inauguration is the point of demarcation from 
transition to reality. The new team is expected to begin effectively governing.  The 
authority of the office is now theirs to wield. Among the career workforce, the period 
of transition continues as policy agendas shift, priorities are rearranged, roles adjust, 
and as political appointees appear in the departments and agencies. Both sides aim 
to reach a new point of equilibrium quickly and with the least effort. 
1. The New Administration 
After the dancing stops at the end of the inaugural balls, the new team is 
expected to begin effectively governing. There is still much transition work to do. Of 
highest importance are matters of personnel and process. Among the first matters of 
official business is the formal nomination of individuals for the cabinet- and critical 
sub-cabinet-level positions. The most important will be vetted early, with nominations 
ready to send to Congress immediately after Inauguration Day in order to take 
advantage of the “honeymoon” period during which Congress is likely to yield to 
wishes of the new president. 
The success of the new team in taking control of the agencies of government 
also depends on numerous other factors summarized in Table 3.  How much did the 
outgoing team do in its last weeks to tie the hands of the incoming team? If particular 
polices were thwarted or co-opted by the exiting team, the incoming team may wish 
to shift emphasis. By what margin of victory did the incoming team win; what is the 
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more power the incoming administration can presume. Are there Congressional 
coattails to ride? If the opposing party gained seats in Congress, there was a mixed 
message by the populace, and the new president’s powers are limited. If the 
president-elect’s party also gained seats, there is more potential for substantive 
change. New administrations can learn from history. A measured, calculated 
agenda, prioritized and tailored to these conditions will serve the administration well.  
Table 3. Factors Affecting Successful Transition71 
 
Positively related Negatively related 
Margin of victory President-elect is DC outsider 
Congressional election coattails Hubris 
Knowledge of political process Haste 
Ability to shift from campaigning to governing Naïveté 
Early start to transition Campaign negatively portrayed the “bureaucracy” 
Separate campaign and transition teams Transition headquarters distance from DC 
Organized personnel process 24-hour news cycle 
Communication with predecessor Activism of outgoing administration last 100 days 
Communication with career executives Complexity of reform agenda for first 100 days 
Ability to use the career executives to shape 
implementation strategy  
 
Successful new administrations continue to learn the bureaucratic and 
political processes as policy agenda implementation plans are finalized. It is 
important for the new team to establish a clear set of policy priorities and to choose 
a limited number of them for immediate attention. Other, relatively minor campaign 
                                            
71 Contents adapted from Burke, J.P. (2001); Pfiffner, J.P. (1996); Pfiffner, J.P. (forthcoming, 2009); 
Kumar, M.J., & Sullivan, T. (2003); and Eksterowicz, A.J, & Hastedt, G. (1998). Modern presidential 
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issues can be deferred. Clinton found himself entangled in the policy on gays in the 
military early in his administration, deflecting attention from items more central to his 
agenda. Conversely, Reagan remained focused on relatively few items and pursued 
them doggedly. Both were DC outsiders, but Reagan prepared more thoroughly, 
managed Congressional relations better, and stuck to his agenda. On the other 
hand, Reagan’s campaign against bureaucratic waste may have created suspicion 
and distrust in the eyes of career employees; accordingly, portions of his agenda 
faced a slow start. 
In her study of the Department of Transportation and the Office of Housing 
and Urban Development, Patricia Ingraham noted, “If elected officials wish their 
efforts to be fully productive, they must begin with a better understanding of internal 
management processes in public organizations.”72 Such understanding is held by the 
career workforce and must be learned by the new political leadership. Thus, good 
working relationships between the new administration’s political appointees and the 
career executives in the agencies are important. The Nixon Administration attempted 
to seize control of the bureaucracy from within the White House and Cabinet with 
only limited success. Carter overcompensated and decentralized power and had 
even less success. What is the right approach? In today’s environment, it is more 
challenging to control the bureaucracy centrally; effective governance is necessarily 
cooperative.73 Indeed, neoliberal reforms that expanded transparency, expanded the 
reach of government into society, resulted in outsourcing or co-production of 
government functions, and implemented federal policy through state and local 
governments all mitigate against a return to the “Imperial Presidency.”74  
                                            
72 Ingraham, P.W. (1988). Transition and policy change in Washington. Public Productivity Review, 
12(1), 61-72, p. 64. 
73 Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W.D. (2004). Governing by network: The new shape of the public sector. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
74 Roberts, A. (2008). The collapse of fortress Bush: The crisis of authority in American government. 
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One example of the bureaucratic processes to be mastered in order to affect 
policy is the budget. There are only 15 days from Inauguration until the budget is 
due. Part of the effort during the transition will be devoted to understanding how to 
make important, limited changes to the budget that was prepared by the outgoing 
administration. The budget serves as an important milestone, implementation tool, 
and policy-signaling device for the new team.  
2. The Career Executives 
As the new president places his people into the Executive Branch to shape 
the new policy agenda, the career workforce needs clear direction as soon as 
possible to mitigate the uncertainty of transition and to limit the negative 
organizational effects of that uncertainty. Good communication between the career 
executives and the transition team during the interregnum helps. The newly arriving 
political team should expect some level of natural resistance which “should not be 
interpreted as opposition, but rather as predictable reactions to the process of 
change. Increased efforts at control are more likely to increase resistance than to 
reduce it.”75  
Not all political appointees will arrive in the first weeks; the third and fourth tier 
positions may well be vacant for several months. The career executives will be 
expected to fill that void in the executive leadership ranks.  
The career workforce will perform the administrative tasks of placing the new 
appointees; computer access, security badges, parking places, and such should not 
distract from the business of governing. Briefings, schedule control, meetings with 
counterparts, and direct reports are arranged prior to the appointees’ arrival so their 
first week is productive and the permanent team displays its competence. The 
career executives will be poised to assist the new political leadership in policy 
formation, to advise on policy-implementation hurdles, to suggest improvements to 
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the plans the appointee undoubtedly arrives with, and to instruct the appointee on 
key internal processes.  
Gradually, the new appointee and the career executives will reach an 
agreement on the boundaries of roles and responsibilities and the norms of their 
working relationship. If both understand the transition dynamics in advance, that day 
will come sooner rather than later. For the career executives to be most supportive 
and ensure the policy agenda of the new team is implemented smoothly, they must 
understand the point of view of the incoming team.  It is beneficial for them to take 
time to learn about the background of the appointees to know what frames of 
reference they arrive with, the paradigms that shape their organizational view, and 
their inherent biases.76  For instance, an appointee with a background as a 
Congressional staffer will approach the job differently from one who was previously a 
corporate executive. 
In addition to managing the transition upward, career executives will be 
tasked with managing downward. The middle management will be hungry for 
information about the pending changes to priorities, processes, policies and 
reporting relationships. Being a change agent necessarily involves being a conduit of 
communication.  
D. Conclusion 
The three perspectives are summarized in Table 4.  The point of view of the 
incoming administration is in the top row; the outgoing administration is in the middle 
row, and the career executives’ position is in the bottom row.   
                                            
76 Rainey, H.G., & Wechsler, B. (1988). Executive-level transition: Toward a conceptual framework. 
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• Implement last 100 days agenda 
• Wrap up affairs
• Share lessons with next 
administration
• Consider transition effects 
of actions
• Plan for transition 
administrative activities
• Prepare organization for 
change
• Complete policy agenda
• Build a transition budget
• Promulgate direction to 
agencies regarding transition 
activities
Pre-Election Interregnum                     Post-Election
• Implement Presidential Transition 
Act provisions
• Build briefing books
• Meet with transition team; 
provide information
• Manage organizational change 
dynamics
• Prepare to assume temporary 
leadership role
• Assume leadership role pending 
new appointments
• Orient and advise the new team
• Complete the budget
• Implement new policy agenda
• Manage organizational change
• Campaign
• Establish Transition Team
• Analyze issues, formulate 
policies
• Consider policy 
implementation strategies
• Establish prospective 
White House team
• Establish DC presence
• Learn political processes
• Build relationships with Congress
• Select and vet key personnel
• Design White House operations
• Enter agencies and departments 
Refine policies and implementation 
strategies; set the agenda
• Learn bureaucratic processes
• Establish a functioning White 
House
• Place political appointees
• Implement agenda
• Adjust the budget
• Continue to learn about and 





























While the process was presented along the three chronological periods, let us 
summarize by the three perspectives. The incoming administration begins transition 
activities well before the campaign ends by establishing a transition organization. 
That organization is responsible for the migration from a focus on winning a 
campaign to a focus on governing and implementing an agenda. Policy positions, 
the team’s implementation strategies, and the key personnel to lead that 
implementation are an early focus. Later, they focus on learning the political and 
bureaucratic processes necessary for successful policy implementation. An efficient 
White House organization is established, and personnel are placed within the 
executive agencies. 
The outgoing administration is primarily focused on completing the highest 
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attempt to do that through bureaucratic momentum and unilateral actions. 
Administratively, it will prepare a transition budget to hand to the new administration 
and will put in motion the provisions of the Presidential Transition Acts to ensure a 
seamless transfer of authority. 
The career executives are focused upward toward the political change. They 
are implementing the final stages of the outgoing team’s agenda; they are preparing 
for the administrative portions of the transition event; they will work with the new 
team to orient them to the functions and issues in their agency, and they will 
eventually assist in the implementation of the new agenda. Simultaneously, they are 
focused downward as they manage the organizational change dynamics inherent 
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5. Recommendations and Concluding Thoughts 
The foregoing analysis suggests that three major sets of players experience 
the transition with differing perspectives, have unique needs, and assume varying 
roles. The political leaders of the outgoing administration are focused on issues 
related to their legacy, wishing to assure that the policies and programs they 
instituted and managed over four or eight years will continue. The incoming 
administration is interested in seizing control of both policy and bureaucracy, 
wanting to replace the previous policy agenda with its own and to bend the 
permanent government apparatus to its priorities. The career civilian and military 
members of the permanent bureaucracy are compelled by custom and by law to be 
loyal and responsive to the outgoing government until Inauguration Day, while 
assisting both incoming and outgoing leaders during the transition period and 
shifting loyalty and responsiveness to the new political leadership upon Inauguration. 
The potential for friction or even conflict during the transition and early governing 
period is apparent.  Differences over policy or politics can strain the relationships 
between incoming and outgoing political leaders. Bureaucratic responsiveness to the 
current administration and natural rigidity in the face of change can be misconstrued 
and viewed as disloyalty by incoming leaders.  
But, the above analysis also suggests outgoing administrations are more 
inclined toward co-operation with the incoming administration than might be 
expected, even in instances where party affiliations are different. So, while there is 
always the possibility of a turbulent transition (did the outgoing Clinton staff really 
remove all the Ws from the White House keyboards?), there are also opportunities 
for a transition in which the incoming administration can learn from its predecessors 
and utilize the expertise of the bureaucracy to minimize the risks of a bad start or a 
loss of institutional strengths and momentum.  A smooth transition can also rest on 
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current political leaders, but who are also skilled at recognizing and dealing with 
changes in leadership, regardless of swings in policy direction.   
 This would seem to be especially true in the area of defense business 
management reform. While the new administration in January 2009 might well want 
to jettison the term “transformation” as being too closely associated with the 
outgoing administration, incoming officials will face the same pressures for better 
business practices as their predecessors.  All signs indicate that the 2008 
candidates understand the management challenges within the DoD. Neither 
candidate advocates a wholesale cut in defense spending, and both are running on 
platforms of responsible defense management. Key differences exist on the 
employment of the force (e.g., the Iraq policy), but there are far fewer differences on 
the administration of the Department. Whether the candidates wish to stake-out a 
distinct management agenda or not, external pressures will force them into doing so. 
At the same time, this outgoing administration has been more active than most in 
developing transformation-governance structures and programs; such structures and 
programs merit examination and decisions by the new administration about whether 
to continue, alter, or discard them. In addition, the career and military bureaucracy 
has established processes and procedures to facilitate management reform that can 
serve the new administration just as it did the old administration.   
Thus, we conclude by recognizing three DoD management-related conditions 
for the coming transition: 
1. The outgoing administration has made significant progress in the 
governance and operation of defense management reform. 
2. The incoming administration will need to develop a defense 
management agenda in the face of persistent problems and 
congressional pressure. 
3. The career military and civilians in the DoD possess knowledge and 
understanding of the outgoing administration’s defense management 
reform and will be responsive to a new administration in developing a 
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From these three observations, we then derive three sets of 
recommendations for participants in the coming transition.  
Outgoing Appointees:  
 Conscientiously prepare for the transition by codifying your reform 
initiatives and governance structures.  
 Brief the transition team to provide an accurate picture of the status of 
reform efforts. 
 Do not unnecessarily restrict the next administration by taking late 
unilateral actions—while there will be policy differences between the 
current and next administration, good management is ecumenical and 
should not be among them. 
 Place career civilian and military personnel in key positions to manage 
through transition. Select executives for these roles who are widely 
respected in the department, are knowledgeable about management 
reform, and are able to adjust quickly to new leadership.  
Incoming Transition Team and Appointees:  
 Listen to your predecessors. Be open-minded to their advice and 
lessons. Place your own stamp on the reform agenda but resist the 
temptation to ignore or disparage all that has gone before. 
 Evaluate existing management initiatives and decide which should be 
continued and which should be terminated.  
 The above evaluation should cover both the means and ends of 
reform. Decide whether there will be a shift in relative emphasis across 
functional areas of reform and whether you’ll employ different means to 
effect that change. 
 Study the history of prior reform initiatives. Very little of what you will 
propose is brand new—seek to understand what happened last time it 
was tried. Improve on that track record. 
 Take time to learn the bureaucratic and political processes in the 
Department—they will necessarily be part of your implementation 
strategy. You cannot do this alone—a successful reform agenda must 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 62 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Use the career officials; they are a source of knowledge and a tool for 
implementing change. Listen to their advice and ideas. Although they 
formerly worked for your predecessor, do not assume that they are 
politically aligned with the previous administration. Give them an 
opportunity to prove themselves.  
Career Executives:  
 Remain neutrally competent. Attend to the myriad administrative 
details of the transition while ensuring the Department’s vital work 
continues uninterrupted. 
 Assist the transition by remaining loyal and responsive to your 
outgoing leaders while facilitating and responding to the needs of 
transition.  
 Fill any leadership vacuum. Third- and fourth-tier appointees will not 
arrive for weeks or months. 
 This is a challenging time to lead. Prepare your organizations for the 
change. There will be a tendency for your portion of the Department to 
become rigid and inflexible in the face of uncertainty. As the conduit of 
information, you can ease that uncertainty. 
 Immediately transfer your loyalty and responsiveness to the new 
leaders when they take office. Be mindful that different is not 
synonymous with wrong. 
 Seek to understand the new administration’s perspective and goals; 
offer your best and honest advice on policy formulation and 
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